{"id":41189,"date":"2026-11-08T18:04:48","date_gmt":"2026-11-08T18:04:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wedodis.co.za\/news\/?p=41189"},"modified":"2026-11-08T18:04:48","modified_gmt":"2026-11-08T18:04:48","slug":"south-africas-electricity-future-hangs-in-the-balance-amid-gas-shortages","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/wedodis.co.za\/news\/south-africas-electricity-future-hangs-in-the-balance-amid-gas-shortages\/","title":{"rendered":"South Africa’s Electricity Future Hangs in the Balance Amid Gas Shortages"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The electricity forecast for South Africa over the next decade offers a generally positive outlook, yet the underlying assumptions warrant thorough scrutiny.<\/p>\n

Concerns persist following a failed gas procurement round, significant coal retirements, and stringent performance targets set for Eskom.<\/p>\n

Over the coming ten years, South Africa is likely to sidestep major electricity shortages, contingent on Eskom maintaining its recovery, timely arrival of replacement power, and planned expansion of the transmission grid.<\/p>\n

This is the nuanced conclusion in the National Transmission Company South Africa\u2019s (NTCSA) Medium-Term System Adequacy Outlook (MTSAO) 2027\u20132036, published on 30 October 2026.<\/p>\n

However, this report was released merely two days after the government disclosed the failure of its inaugural gas-to-power procurement initiative.<\/p>\n

This raises a critical question about the validity of the MTSAO Reference Case when one of its key premises is already under scrutiny.<\/p>\n

The NTCSA\u2019s Reference Case is premised on significant growth in electricity demand, enhanced performance from Eskom\u2019s plants, a large influx of renewable energy and storage, major upgrades to transmission systems, and new gas-fired generation expected from 2032.<\/p>\n

Notably, this is not a low-demand outlook intended to provide assurance about system adequacy.<\/p>\n

In the High Demand scenario, the annual electricity sent out is projected to rise to 329.7 TWh, with peak demand reaching 49.1 GW by 2036, up from 238.3 TWh and 35.8 GW in 2026.<\/p>\n

This demand escalation underscores the pressing need for new generation capacity to replace older facilities scheduled for retirement.<\/p>\n

Nonetheless, the system is not risk-free. By 2036, the NTCSA Reference Case still indicates 13.42 GWh and 377 hours of unserved energy.<\/p>\n

This represents instances where electricity demand cannot be fulfilled, rather than a prediction of nationwide load-shedding.<\/p>\n

The study utilizes advanced hourly, network-constrained simulations, yet the resulting forecasts remain conditional and are not conveyed with certainty.<\/p>\n

According to the MTSAO Reference Case, Eskom’s energy availability factor (EAF) is expected to increase from 66% in the fiscal year 2027 to 70% by 2031, maintaining that level until 2036.<\/p>\n

In contrast, a downside scenario retains the EAF at 65%, creating a critical five-percentage-point discrepancy as Eskom’s fleet diminishes.<\/p>\n

Eskom\u2019s EAF under the spotlight<\/h2>\n
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The MTSAO report posits that around 16.2 GW of Eskom capacity will be decommissioned by 2036, including 8.75 GW in 2029 and 2030.<\/p>\n

Most of the retirements are coal stations, with two diesel peaking plants also scheduled for closure. Contracts for 1,150 MW from Cahora Bassa and 1,005 MW from the Avon and Dedisa plants are set to expire in 2030.<\/p>\n

Additionally, about 3 GW of current renewable projects are anticipated to conclude their operational or contractual periods between 2033 and 2036.<\/p>\n

The report highlights Eskom’s recent improvements, noting an increase in EAF from 56% in FY 2023 to 66% by 2026. However, guaranteeing a 70% EAF on a diminishing, outdated fleet is uncertain.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, a higher EAF percentage should not obscure the actual megawatt (MW) capacity underlying that percentage; a higher EAF on a smaller fleet does not automatically yield a greater supply of available megawatts.<\/p>\n

Critical analysis is needed regarding the timing of coal retirements, life extension projects, and replacements. New gas generation is another essential component of the MTSAO Reference Case.<\/p>\n

None of this capacity is expected to come online until 2032, when 3 GW from Eskom and 2 GW from independent power producers (IPPs) may be operational.<\/p>\n

Gas generation will expand to 3 GW in 2033, with additions from the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2025 bringing the total new gas generation to 9.75 GW by 2036.<\/p>\n

However, on 28 October, the Department of Electricity and Energy announced that the Gas IPP Procurement Programme’s first bid window did not yield any preferred bidders.<\/p>\n

Four bids amounting to 2,830 MW were submitted for the 2,000 MW on offer, yet none met the essential criteria, primarily due to a lack of reliable gas supply assurances.<\/p>\n

This failure was not merely a lack of investor interest.<\/p>\n

South Africa also lacks a functional liquefied natural gas import terminal, and the challenges related to fuel supply extend beyond the unsuccessful IPP bids to the broader gas development program needed to address industrial gas needs.<\/p>\n

The ministerial determination issued on 7 October 2026 for 5,000 MW of gas-to-power establishes a procurement framework but lacks concrete sources of gas, port terminals, viable projects, or commissioning timelines.<\/p>\n

Notably, the MTSAO acknowledges that the developments from October 2026 were not factored into its model inputs from June 2026.<\/p>\n

The report\u2019s concluding remarks caution that the risks associated with gas delivery have escalated, advising that the Reference Case outcomes from 2032 should be approached with heightened scrutiny.<\/p>\n

What the Perfect Storm does \u2014 and does not \u2014 show<\/h2>\n
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Gas-to-power plants in the United Kingdom.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The MTSAO’s Perfect Storm scenario encompasses high electricity demand, a 65% EAF, absence of new gas supply, and a slower rollout of small-scale embedded generation.<\/p>\n

Under these conditions, the situation worsens significantly from 2033 onward, with annual unserved energy projected to exceed 900 GWh by 2036.<\/p>\n

This figure far surpasses the adequacy standard of 20 GWh, while the average magnitude of severe shortfalls exceeds 2,000 MW, and utilization of diesel peaking plants exceeds the 6% threshold.<\/p>\n

These statistics are alarming indicators. However, they do not represent a sole assessment of the ramifications of losing gas.<\/p>\n

Four negative assumptions must alter in tandem. The analysis does not depict outcomes if gas delivery is postponed but Eskom achieves a 70% EAF, or if gas comes online while the EAF remains at 65%.<\/p>\n

This distinction is vital. The Perfect Storm context showcases the compounded vulnerabilities of simultaneous adverse conditions.<\/p>\n

Yet it does not prove that the entire 9.75 GW gas development is critical, nor does it indicate that a failure to deliver this capacity alone would result in a national electricity crisis.<\/p>\n

Could faster renewables and storage close the gap?<\/h2>\n
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Scatec\u2019s Kenhardt Hybrid Solar and Battery Farm<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The MTSAO Accelerated Build scenario presents an interesting juxtaposition, featuring lower demand, an increased EAF, accelerated generation deployment, and higher embedded generation uptake.<\/p>\n

This scenario largely eliminates any adequacy gaps; however, it relies on new gas capacity, thus it does not test the viability of a renewables-and-storage system in a gas-free context.<\/p>\n

The MTSAO Reference Portfolio anticipates 17.7 GW of solar PV and 22.1 GW of wind power by 2036, alongside battery storage and embedded generation options. The overall potential for renewables is even greater.<\/p>\n

A key consideration is whether actively advancing credible wind, solar, storage, flexible demand, and transmission projects could mitigate the implications of delayed gas procurement.<\/p>\n

Moreover, grid delivery is a critical factor. The MTSAO includes about 14,508 km of new transmission lines and 144 GVA of added transformer capacity.<\/p>\n

Any delays could hinder renewable energy evacuation and lead to local shortages, even if national generating capacity is adequate.<\/p>\n

Challenges persist. The MTSAO Accelerated Build scenario can yield over 43 TWh of excess energy in certain years due to disparities between output, demand, and network capabilities.<\/p>\n

This does not constitute a call to halt renewable initiatives; rather, it highlights the necessity of synchronizing new generation with storage, flexible conventional operation, demand management, and transmission expansion.<\/p>\n

The study\u2019s Reduced Storage analysis emphasizes this need. By 2036, curtailing battery installations to 1,744 MW increases excess energy from 3.54 TWh to 6.37 TWh.<\/p>\n

Unserved energy grows from 13.42 GWh to 28.08 GWh. Consequently, batteries enhance renewable integration and contribute to adequacy.<\/p>\n

The modelling South Africa now needs<\/h2>\n
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The NTCSA should be commended for transparently addressing these limitations. The report even suggests the subsequent tests required: modeling an Accelerated Build scenario without new gas under both low and high demand to determine if a larger renewable and storage setup can sustain adequacy during evening peaks and extended low wind and solar periods.<\/p>\n

Accompanying these tests should be cases that maintain the upper EAF trajectory while deferring gas introduction, alongside sensitivity analyses for coal phase-out timings, storage durations, gas fuel availability, transmission efficacy, and demand responsiveness.<\/p>\n

Results from these scenarios must be compared against capital expenditures, operational costs, emissions, and realistic project timelines. Understanding adequacy alone does not reveal the least costly or lowest-risk technology mix.<\/p>\n

The essential takeaway from the report is not that a substantial gas supply is unavoidably necessary, nor that renewables and storage can seamlessly fill any gaps without qualifications. Rather, it is the realization that South Africa faces numerous interrelated delivery risks as coal and other capacities cease operation.<\/p>\n

Prior to solidifying gas-related assumptions into investment decisions, the system operator and policymakers need to demonstratively ensure\u2014through transparent and comparable scenarios\u2014what combinations of generation, storage, and flexibility options can reliably sustain power supply in the absence of gas.<\/p>\n

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